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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s matter 
pursuant to §78-2A-3(2)(d) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Did the Circuit Court err in concluding that 
the dispatcher did not have knowledge of any facts creating a 
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had committed or was 
committing an offense? 
The above-stated issue was the very focus of the 
hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and has 
therefore been properly preserved for appeal. [R-62-113] 
In reviewing a trial court's determination that 
there was not adequate reasonable suspicion to support a 
traffic stop, the court normally applies two different 
standards of review, one for the trial court's factual 
findings and the other for the court's legal conclusions. 
State v. Case, 884 P. 2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) . The Utah Court 
of Appeals explained the appropriate standard of review in 
such cases as follows: 
The trial court's factual findings 
underlying its decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress evidence are 
examined for clear error. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) . On the 
other hand, the standard to be applied to 
the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the 
facts as found give rise to reasonable 
s u s p i c i o n , "is r e v i e w a b l e 
nondeferentially for correctness, as 
opposed to being a fact determination 
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reviewable for clear error." Pena, 869 
P. 2d at 93 9. Nevertheless, the nature of 
this particular determination of law 
allows the trial court "a measure of 
discretion . . . when applying that 
standard to a given set of facts." 
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) 
The only conclusion of law for the Court to consider on 
appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
there were insufficient articulable facts to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity. This 
conclusion of law should be reviewed nondeferentially for 
correctness. 
2. Did the Circuit Court err in finding that the 
complainant, Mr. DeWayne Olsen had no more than a hunch that 
the man at Mr. Olsen's doorstep was the Defendant? 
This second issue has also been properly preserved 
for appeal as there was substantial testimony from Mr. DeWayne 
Olsen on this point in the hearing on Defendant's motion to 
suppress. [R-66-92] 
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that a "trial court's factual 
findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are examined for clear error." (citing State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9332, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). 
In addition, in order to overturn a trial court's 
findings of fact, the challenger "must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings in 
2 
ques t ion ." P h i l l i p s v. Hatf ield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n . l (Utah 
App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15 i s se t for th verbatim 
in the Argument sect ion of t h i s Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Defendant was originally charged with Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor. 
Defendant claimed that the arresting officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of the 
Defendant's vehicle. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence 
seeking to suppress any and all evidence obtained after the 
stop of the Defendant's vehicle. The Plaintiff filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress. The 
Circuit Court held a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and heard testimony and received other 
evidence and heard argument of Counsel. 
C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
The Circuit Court granted the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence. The evidence which was suppressed included 
a breathalyzer test which was taken by the Defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 7, 1996, at approximately 5:15 a.m., 
Mr. DeWayne Olsen received a telephone call which Mr. Olsen 
picked up. There was no response on the line so Mr. Olsen 
hung up and dialed a last call return mechanism and received 
an answering machine message that indicated that this was the 
Defendant Joseph Mulcahy's telephone number. [R-66,68, and 
69.] 
2. A few minutes later, Mr. Olsen received another 
hang-up call. Mr. Olsen again dialed a last call return 
mechanism which again connected Mr. Olsen to the telephone of 
the Defendant Joseph Mulcahy. Mr. Olsen left a message on the 
answering machine of the Defendant stating that Mr. Olsen did 
not want the Defendant calling or bothering him, especially at 
that time of the morning and that Mr. Olsen did not want the 
Defendant's telephone calls. [R-69-70] 
3. Either between the two hang-up calls or after 
the second hang-up call, Mr. Olsen called Kaysville City to 
inquire about how to register a complaint about the harassing 
telephone calls. The person that Mr. Olsen spoke to asked Mr. 
Olsen if he wanted to pursue the complaint at that time and 
Mr. Olsen responded that he would wait until morning during 
regular business hours to pursue the complaint, if at all. 
[R-71] 
4. At approximately 5:30 a.m. the Defendant called 
Mr. Olsen again and when Mr. Olsen answered the telephone, the 
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Defendant stated essentially "This is Joe. What's happening?" 
Mr. Olsen reiterated again that he did not want to deal with 
him, didn't want to talk with him, and didn't want him 
calling. Mr. Olsen hung up immediately after delivering this 
message to the Defendant. [R-72] 
5. After Mr. Olsen hung up on the Defendant, the 
Defendant called back a second, third and maybe a fourth time. 
On each of these occasions, Mr. Olsen would hear who was 
trying to call and would hang up. Eventually Mr. Olsen took 
the telephone off the hook for a few minutes. [R-72] 
6. Prior to the Defendant's calls to Mr. Olsen, 
Mr. Olsen had known the Defendant because the Defendant had 
associated with Mr. Olsen's daughter. On one occasion, Mr. 
Olsen had sat down in his living room with the Defendant and 
had talked to the Defendant for about an hour. [R-73] 
7. When Mr. Olsen talked to the Defendant on the 
morning of April 7, 1996, Mr. Olsen noticed that the 
Defendant's speech sounded perhaps a little slow, a little 
slurred. The Defendant's speech was different than what Mr. 
Olsen had noticed on prior occasions when he had talked to the 
Defendant and Mr. Olsen believed the Defendant to be under the 
influence of alcohol or intoxicated. [R-73-74] 
8. At approximately 6:00 A.M., Mr. Olsen heard a 
car drive up outside his house. When the car stopped, Mr. 
Olsen immediately got up and looked out his window. He saw a 
male about the Defendant's size exiting the car. Mr. Olsen 
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observed this individual heading towards Mr. Olsen7s driveway 
which leads to his front door. [R-74-75] 
9. Although it was somewhat dark outside and Mr. 
Olsen was unable to clearly distinguish the facial features of 
the individual, Mr. Olsen was at least reasonably sure that 
the individual coming to his door was the Defendant. [R-75, 
87] 
10. When the Defendant reached Mr. Olsen's doorstep 
he began ringing Mr. Olsen's doorbell a number of times. The 
Defendant remained on Mr. Olsen's doorstep for several 
minutes. [R-77, 90] 
11. Mr. Olsen did not want to deal with the 
Defendant because Mr. Olsen believed that the Defendant was 
intoxicated and because Mr. Olsen did not know what the 
intention of the Defendant was and because it was not a 
reasonable hour of the day. [R-75, 90] 
12. Mr. Olsen called 911 and told the dispatcher 
that he had a drunk individual on his doorstep ringing his 
doorbell. Mr. Olsen further stated that he did not know what 
this individual's intentions were but he wanted to have an 
officer over at the residence. The call to 911 was actually 
made at 5:58 a.m. [R-75,77-78] 
13. The dispatcher confirmed that Mr. Olsen's name 
was DeWayne Olsen and that he lived at 667 South 150 East, 
Kaysville# Utah. [R-78] 
6 
14. The dispatcher sent an officer in the direction 
of Mr. Olsen's residence. [R-78,98] 
15. Some time later, Mr. Olsen informed the 
dispatcher that the individual was driving off in a white 
Toyota and was heading toward the "Main drag". He told the 
dispatcher that the vehicle was traveling east toward the 
mountain and that that would lead on to the main road that 
goes in front of Davis High School. [R-79-80] 
16. Mr. Olsen informed the dispatcher that he had 
earlier called to get some information about what he could do 
about harassing telephone calls and informed the dispatcher 
that the name of the person at his door was "Joe" and Joe's 
telephone number was 774-9808. [R-81] 
17. The dispatcher understood that Mr. Olsen had 
received a harassing telephone call and that Mr. Olsen 
believed that the person who made the harassing telephone call 
was the same person who was at his doorstep ringing his 
doorbell. [R-81] 
18. At approximately 6:00 A.M. on April 7, 1996, 
Kaysville City Police Officer Darron Heslop heard a dispatch 
to any unit in the Kaysville area with regard to a "1047"-
individual believed to be drunk and ringing the doorbell. 
1047 is code for suspicious vehicle, person or incident. [R-
94, 98, 100] 
19. Officer Heslop left the office to go to the 
address given in the dispatch. While on route to that 
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residence, Officer Heslop was advised by the dispatcher that 
the suspect individual had left the residence in a white 
Toyota and was heading towards Davis High School. [R-94,98] 
20. Officer Heslop traveled from the location of 
the Kaysville Police Department at 58 East 100 North in 
Kaysville toward Davis High School. Officer Heslop observed 
that there was no traffic flow on the road and that it was 
just beginning to get light outside. [R-95] 
21. As Officer Heslop approached the area of Davis 
High School, Officer Heslop saw the headlights of a vehicle 
heading north on Main Street which vehicle passed Officer 
Heslop. Officer Heslop observed that the vehicle was white. 
Officer Heslop first observed the vehicle at Davis High School 
at the approximate location of the intersection of 200 South 
and Main Street in Kaysville, Utah. At this time there were 
no other cars moving on the roads. Officer Heslop believed 
that the white vehicle he observed could possibly be the 
suspect in this case. Officer Heslop identified the vehicle 
as a white Mazda.[R-95-96] 
22. Officer Heslop stopped the vehicle at the 
location of 100 South Main Street in Kaysville, Utah. Officer 
Heslop identified the driver of the vehicle as the Defendant 
Joseph Mulcahy. [R-96-97] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Complainant DeWayne Olsen had a reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts that the man that 
8 
appeared at his doorstep at approximately 6:00 a.m. on April 
7, 1996 was the Defendant Joseph Mulcahy. Mr. Olsen also had 
reason to believe that the Defendant Joseph Mulcahy was 
intoxicated at the time that the Defendant appeared on Mr. 
Olsen's front doorstep and began ringing his doorbell. The 
Defendant's numerous telephone calls to Mr. Olsen at an 
extremely inconvenient and unusual hour of the morning, and 
the slowed and slurred speech which Mr. Olsen detected in the 
Defendant's voice, reasonably led Mr. Olsen to believe that 
the Defendant was drunk. 
After having told the Defendant that he did not want to 
talk with him or deal with him on the telephone, Mr. Olsen had 
reason to be concerned and alarmed when the Defendant showed 
up on Mr. Olsen's doorstep and began ringing his doorbell 
repeatedly. Mr. Olsen had reason to suspect possible criminal 
intent and/or criminal conduct on the part of the Defendant. 
Mr. Olsen's statement to the dispatcher that he had a drunk 
individual on his doorstep ringing his doorbell at 6:00 A.M. 
on a Sunday morning constituted sufficient articulable facts 
upon which the dispatcher based her reasonable suspicion that 
the Defendant had committed or may have been in the process of 
committing some criminal act. The subsequent stop of the 
Defendant's vehicle for questioning and investigation as to 
these suspicious circumstances was, therefore, justified and 
appropriate. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
COMPLAINANT DEWAYNE OLSEN HAD NO MORE 
THAN A HUNCH THAT THE PERSON AT MR. 
OLSEN'S DOORSTEP WAS THE DEFENDANT 
In its order granting Defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial court found that the complainant in this 
case, Mr. DeWayne Olsen, did not know the identity of the 
individual who was on Mr. Olsen's doorstep ringing his 
doorbell. The court found that "Mr. Olsen really just had a 
hunch that he was the defendant, with whom he had talked on 
the telephone within the preceding hour." 
This finding of the trial court should be reversed 
because it is clearly erroneous. See State v. Case, 884 P. 2d 
1274 (Utah App. 1994). A trial court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous if they "are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Accord State 
v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990). The evidence which 
was presented at the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress 
is insufficient to support the trial court's finding stated 
above even considering all of the evidence which supports the 
trial court's finding. 
The following constitutes all of the evidence which 
supports the finding of the trial court: 
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1. Mr. Olsen testified that after hearing a car 
stop in front of his house, he looked out the window and saw 
a male about the Defendant's size exiting the car. Mr. Olsen 
testified that he could not say for certain that it was him 
(the Defendant) because there was still some darkness there. 
Mr. Olsen further testified that he did not immediately 
recognize Joe (the Defendant). [R-74] 
2. Mr. Olsen testified that he was reasonably 
certain that the individual that came up to his door was Joe 
but stated that he didn't have any absolute knowledge that it 
was Joe. [R-75] When asked by the dispatcher if he knew the 
individual at his door, Mr. Olsen replied "I can guess who he 
is, but I don't want to deal with him." [R-78] 
3. Mr. Olsen testified that he could tell that the 
individual on his doorstep was a male and was about Joe's size 
but Mr. Olsen could not distinctly tell if it was Joe or not. 
[R-87] 
4. Mr. Olsen did not see the individual stagger 
[R-86] , and could not tell if the individual had a short 
haircut or light-colored hair or blue eyes. [R-87] Mr. Olsen 
did not give a description of the Defendant to the dispatcher. 
[R-87] 
5. Mr. Olsen didn't open his door and did not 
smell any alcohol on the individual at his doorstep. [R-91] 
Mr. Olsen could not identify the individual as the Defendant 
although he was reasonably sure it was the Defendant. [R-91] 
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When Mr. Olsen told the dispatcher that the name of the 
individual was Joe, he was assuming it was Joe based on Mr. 
Olsen's earlier experiences and not based on any observations 
Mr. Olsen made on his front porch. [R91] 
6. Mr. Olsen did not see the individual go back to 
his car. [R-88] 
7. When describing the make and color of the 
Defendant's vehicle to the dispatcher, Mr. Olsen was unable to 
give a completely accurate description of the vehicle. Mr. 
Olsen described the vehicle as possibly a white Toyota Celica 
when in fact the vehicle was a white Mazda. [R-79, 96] 
8. Mr. Olsen did not recognize the Defendant's 
vehicle and was unable to associate the vehicle with the 
Defendant. [R-92] 
9. When Mr. Olsen told the dispatcher that he 
thought that the name of the individual was Joe, Mr. Olsen 
wasn't really sure of Joe's last name. [R-85] 
The sum total of the evidence which supports the 
trial court's finding is that Mr. Olsen could not with 
certainty visually identify the Defendant because of the 
darkness and could not associate the suspect's car with the 
Defendant. Mr. Olsen also could not see the Defendant stagger 
and did not detect any odor of alcohol on the Defendant. This 
evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding 
that Mr. Olsen did not know or had only a hunch that the 
individual at his doorstep was the Defendant. Mr. Olsen did 
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not have an absolute knowledge that the suspect was the 
Defendant. However, he did know with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that the suspect was in fact the Defendant. At the 
very least, Mr. Olsen had a reasonable suspicion based on 
articulable facts that the suspect was the Defendant. 
A "hunch" is essentially a belief or suspicion 
unsupported by any articulable facts, while a "reasonable 
suspicion" is a belief or suspicion which is supported by 
articulable facts. State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537, 541 (Utah 
App. 1990). There is of course an important distinction 
between a hunch and a reasonable suspicion because the latter 
justifies an investigative stop of a defendant while the 
former does not. 
The trial court's finding that Mr. Olsen didn't know 
the identity of the person at his doorstep or that at most Mr. 
Olsen had only a hunch that it was the Defendant, is the 
equivalent of finding that Mr. Olsen could not articulate any 
facts which supported Mr. Olsen's suspicion that the suspect 
was the Defendant. This finding is clearly erroneous because 
there were several articulable facts which led Mr. Olsen to 
strongly believe that the suspect was the Defendant. These 
articulable facts are discussed below. 
First, Mr. Olsen had received numerous telephone 
calls from the Defendant beginning at approximately 5:15 a.m. 
that morning. On some of these calls the Defendant simply 
hung up before any conversation took place. On at least one 
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call, Mr. Olsen explicitly told the Defendant that he didn't 
want to talk to him and didn't want the Defendant calling. 
The Defendant continued to call back several more times and 
each time, when Mr. Olsen heard who was calling, Mr. Olsen 
would hang up. Eventually Mr. Olsen had to take the phone off 
the hook. 
At approximately 6:00 a.m. Mr. Olsen heard the suspect 
vehicle pull up in front of his house. Mr. Olsen saw a male, 
about the Defendant's size exit the vehicle and come up to his 
doorstep. The individual began ringing Mr. Olsen's doorbell 
a number of times. Mr. Olsen had no reason to believe that 
the suspect was anyone other than the Defendant. 
Mr. Olsen's belief that the suspect was the Defendant was 
not based on a mere hunch or guess. He had just experienced 
a pattern of numerous attempts by the Defendant to call him by 
telephone at an unreasonably early hour of the morning. When 
he refused to talk to the Defendant and took the phone off the 
hook he then had an individual come to his door a short time 
later at 6:00 a.m. while it was still dark out. This 
individual rang his doorbell a number of times. Having taken 
his phone off the hook and having thereby thwarted the 
Defendant's efforts to call him, it was reasonable for Mr. 
Olsen to believe that the Defendant had decided to attempt to 
communicate with Mr. Olsen in person. This suspicion was 
further confirmed by Mr. Olsen's ability to identify the 
individual as a male and about the Defendant's size. 
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Because Mr. Olsen's suspicion that the suspect was the 
Defendant was based on articulable facts, Mr. Olsen's level of 
knowledge was at least a reasonable suspicion. It was 
therefore clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that 
Mr. Olsen had only a hunch that the suspect was the Defendant. 
POINT II 
OFFICER HESLOP HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
A. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard Defined, 
The United States Supreme Court has held that police 
officers may stop and briefly detain an individual for 
investigative purposes when there is reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the person may be involved in criminal activity. 
United States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)(citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ) ; See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 
(Utah App. 1992). This requirement has been codified in Utah 
Code Annotated §77-7-15 as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Unfortunately, the concept of reasonable suspicion is 
not readily reduced to any firm set of legal rules. United 
States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) . However, the level of 
suspicion required to justify an investigatory stop of a 
vehicle under the above standard is of a lesser degree than 
that required to support a finding of probable cause. United 
15 
States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)(noting that "probable 
cause means xa fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found,' and the level of suspicion required 
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for 
probable cause.") In determining the existence or absence of 
reasonable suspicion in a particular situation the court must 
look to the totality of the circumstances. United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989. 
The reasonable suspicion standard does not require that 
a law enforcement officer have certain knowledge that a person 
committed a crime before effectuating a stop of that person. 
It is not even required that the conduct giving rise to the 
suspicion be illegal. Rather all that is required is that the 
officer be able to articulate objective facts which justify 
the officer's suspicion of illegal activity. As the Utah 
Court of Appeals noted in State v. Nguyen, 878 P. 2d 1183 (Utah 
App. 1994): 
" the conduct observed and/or 
information relied upon need not be 
illegal or describe illegal activity in 
order to give a law enforcement officer 
reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, so long as the officer can 
articulate facts which form the basis for 
his or her suspicion." 
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may exist even 
where the conduct relied upon in forming the suspicion is also 
consistent with innocent activity as long as the conduct is 
also n% strongly indicative' of criminal activity." Provo City 
Corp. v. Spotts 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Furthermore, reasonable suspicion may be supported by a series 
of facts taken together, even where any one of the facts 
standing alone would be insufficient to create a reasonable 
suspicion. Id. 
B. Officer Heslop Was Justified in Reiving on the Dispatch 
Message in Stopping the Defendant's Vehicle. 
A police officer who makes a stop of a vehicle is 
not required to have first-hand knowledge of the facts which 
create a reasonable suspicion that a Defendant committed a 
criminal offense. Rather a police officer is entitled to rely 
upon a dispatch or bulletin issued by other police officers. 
In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-231, 83 
L.Ed.2nd 604, 613 (1985) the Supreme Court held as follows: 
We conclude that, if a flier or bulletin 
has been issued on the basis of 
articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that the wanted person has 
committed an offense, then reliance on 
that flier or bulletin justifies a stop 
to check identification, to pose 
questions to the person, or to detain the 
person briefly while attempting to obtain 
further information. If the flier [or 
bulletin] has been issued in the absence 
of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in 
the objective reliance upon it violates 
the Fourth Amendment. 
* * * * * 
Assuming the police make a Terry stop in 
objective reliance on a flier or 
bulletin, we hold that the evidence 
uncovered in the course of the stop is 
admissible if the police who issued the 
flier or bulletin possessed a reasonable 
suspicion justifying a stop, and if the 
stop that in fact occurred was not 
significantly more intrusive than would 
have been permitted the issuing 
[officers]. 
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Officer Heslop was justified in stopping the 
Defendant's vehicle based on the dispatch report indicating 
that the driver of a white Toyota in the area of Main Street 
and Davis High School in Kaysville may have committed a 
criminal offense as long as the Dispatcher who issued the 
transmission had knowledge of articulable facts which 
supported a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had 
committed a criminal offense. As the Utah Court of Appeals 
noted in State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) : 
" If the investigating officer cannot 
provide independent or corroborating 
information through his or her own 
observations, the legality of a stop 
based on information imparted by another 
will depend on the sufficiency of the 
articulable facts known to the individual 
originating the information or bulletin 
subsequently received and acted upon by 
the investigating officer.11 
The investigating officer need not be informed of 
the facts known to the originating source. .Id. at 1277, n. 5 
(stating that an officer who receives a radio dispatch may 
take it at face value and act on it forthwith but that the 
state must show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion 
prompted issuance of the dispatch in the first place.) 
C. The Davis County Dispatcher Had Knowledge Of Facts Creating 
A Reasonable Suspicion That The Defendant Had Committed Or Was 
Committing A Crime. 
The dispatcher who issued the radio bulletin in this 
case had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant 
may have been involved in criminal activity. At approximately 
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5:58 a.m. on April 7, 1996 the dispatcher received a 911 call 
from Mr. DeWayne Olsen indicating that a drunk individual was 
present on his door step ringing the doorbell. The 
information conveyed to the dispatcher by Mr. Olsen would on 
its face raise a suspicion of several possible criminal 
offenses justifying the dispatcher in sending out police 
officers to more fully investigate the matter. At a minimum, 
the facts relayed by Mr. Olsen to the dispatcher raised a 
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant may have committed or 
was in the process of committing the offenses of intoxication, 
criminal trespass, driving under the influence of alcohol, 
and/or telephone harassment. A description of these four 
offenses and an analysis of why there was reasonable suspicion 
to believe that the Defendant had or was committing one or 
more of these offenses is provided below: 
1. INTOXICATION, (Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
§76-9-701) as follows: 
"(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he 
is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled 
substance, or any substance having the property of 
releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person 
may endanger himself or another, in a public place 
or in a private place where he unreasonably 
disturbs other persons." (Emphasis added). 
The allegations of Mr. DeWayne Olsen regarding the 
individual at his doorstep would meet the elements of the 
above-described offense as Mr. Olsen alleged that the 
individual was drunk and was engaging in conduct which 
unreasonably disturbed Mr. Olsen. 
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2. CRIMINAL TRESPASS, (Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, §76-6-206) as follows: 
11
 (2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass 
if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary 
as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-
204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully 
on property and: 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance 
or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti 
as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any 
crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to 
whether his presence will cause fear for 
the safety of another; or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence 
is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to 
the actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure 
obviously designed to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs 
reasonably likely to come to the 
attention of intruders." 
The complaint of Mr. Olsen regarding the behavior of 
the individual at his door step would immediately raise a 
suspicion of a possible trespass. The fact that Mr. Olsen was 
complaining about the individual's presence at his doorstep 
would indicate to the dispatcher that the person was not 
welcome on Mr. Olsen's property and was apparently causing 
annoyance and fear on the part of Mr. Olsen. 
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3. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, 
(Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §41-6-44) as follows: 
11
 (2) (a) A person may not operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath 
alcohol concentration of .08 grams of 
greater as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged 
operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle." 
Mr. Olsen informed the dispatcher that the person at his 
doorstep was drunk and later informed the dispatcher that the 
individual was driving away in a white Toyota car on a public 
street. These allegations, if true, would meet the elements 
of the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol 
and would give the dispatcher sufficient facts to form a 
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was in the process of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
4. TELEPHONE HARASSMENT: (Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §76-9-201) as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone 
harassment and subject to prosecution in the 
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or 
was received if with intent to annoy, alarm 
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, 
harass, or frighten any person at the called number 
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person: 
(b) makes repeated telephone 
calls, whether or not a conversation 
ensues, or after having been told not to 
call back, causes the telephone of 
another to ring repeatedly or 
continuously; 
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Mr. Olsen informed the dispatcher that the person at his 
doorstep was the same person who had been making harassing 
telephone calls to Mr. Olsen earlier that morning. 
Communication of this information to the dispatcher 
constituted sufficient articulable facts upon which the 
dispatcher could form a reasonable suspicion of a violation of 
the telephone harassment statute. 
P. The Davis County Dispatcher Was Justified In Reiving On The 
Allegations Of A Known Citizen Informant, 
The allegations of Mr. Olsen to the dispatcher gave the 
dispatcher knowledge of sufficient facts upon which to form a 
suspicion that the Defendant had committed or was in the 
process of committing one or more criminal offenses. It was 
not necessary at this point that every allegation of Mr. Olsen 
be verified or proven before the officers could stop the 
Defendant to make further inquiry. A law enforcement officer 
is and should be entitled to rely on information received from 
a known citizen informant. 
In State v. Miller, 740 P. 2d 1363, 1366 (UtahApp. 1987), 
the Utah Court of Appeals discussed the reliability of a 
citizen informant as follows: 
The average neighbor witness is not the type of 
informant in need of independent proof of 
reliability or veracity. Rather, "[v]eracity is 
generally assumed when the information comes from 
an 'average citizen who is in a position to supply 
information by virtue of having been a crime victim 
or witness.' 
Id. at 180 (quoting State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 
1983) . 
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The Oregon Court of Appeals also considered the inherent 
reliability of information provided to law enforcement 
officers by a known citizen informant in State v. Bybee, 884 
P. 2d 906 (Or. App., 1994). In that case, an employee of a 




 [I] wanted to report a drunken driver. 
[I'm] working down here at Ninth Street 7-11. He 
came in just a minute ago. He's driving a blue, 
looked like a MG, an older little sports car 
convertible rag top." 
The caller then gave a license number for the 
suspect vehicle and gave his name and telephone number to the 
dispatcher. Shortly thereafter, an officer spotted the car 
described by the informant and stopped the car based on the 
dispatch message. The driver of the car was subsequently 
arrested for a DUI. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that 
when a report is received from a citizen informant, there must 
be some indicia of reliability to the report. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals considered three factors in 
determining whether a citizen report is reliable. The first 
factor was "whether the informant is exposed to possible 
criminal and civil prosecution if the report is false. That 
factor is satisfied if the informant gives his or her name to 
law enforcement authorities or if the informant delivers the 
information to the officer in person." State v. Bvbee. 884 P. 
2d 906, 908 (Or. App., 1994). The second factor is 
"whether the report is based on the personal 
observations of the informant. An officer may 
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infer that the information is based on the 
informant's personal observations if the 
information contains sufficient detail that 'it 
[is] apparent that the informant had not been 
fabricating [the] report out of whole cloth...[and] 
the report [is] of the sort which in common 
experience may be recognized as having been 
obtained in a reliable way...'" 
Id. (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417-18, 
89 S. Ct. 584, 590, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969). 
The third factor is "whether the officer's own 
observations corroborated the informant's information. The 
officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the 
illegal activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the 
location substantially as described by the informant." Id. 
The three indicia of reliability analyzed by the 
Oregon Court of Appeals are found in the present case. First, 
the dispatcher knew Mr. Olsen's name, address and telephone 
number and Mr. Olsen would potentially be exposed to possible 
criminal and civil prosecution if his report was fabricated. 
See Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §76-8-506. Second, the 
observations communicated to the dispatcher by Mr. Olsen were 
based on his personal observations. Mr. Olsen had previously 
talked with the Defendant that morning and had observed that 
his speech was slurred and slowed to the point that Mr. Olsen 
believed that the Defendant was intoxicated. Mr. Olsen 
observed an individual coming up to his doorstep at 
approximately 5:58 a.m. on a Sunday morning and observed the 
individual ring his doorbell a number of times. Mr. Olsen 
later observed the same individual whom he firmly believed to 
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be the Defendant, enter into his car and drive away in the 
direction of Davis High School. The information communicated 
to the dispatcher was, therefore, based on Mr. Olsen's 
personal observations. Third, the information provided by Mr. 
Olsen was corroborated by Officer Heslop as Officer Heslop 
located the Defendant's car in front of Davis High School 
which was where Mr. Olsen had informed the dispatcher that the 
Defendant's vehicle was heading. The Defendant's car was the 
only vehicle on the road at that early hour of the morning. 
Mr. Olsen had also described the car as a white Toyota and the 
Defendant's vehicle was, in fact, a white Mazda. 
The report and allegations made by Mr. Olsen to the 
dispatcher were, therefore, reliable and constituted a 
sufficient basis upon which the dispatcher could form a 
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had committed or was 
committing one or more criminal offenses. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Davis County dispatcher had knowledge of 
articulable facts which created a reasonable suspicion that 
the Defendant had committed or was committing one or more 
criminal offenses based on the information supplied by Mr. 
DeWayne Olsen. Officer Darron Heslop was entitled to rely on 
the dispatcher's transmission that a person driving a small 
white vehicle in the area of Davis High School and Main Street 
in Kaysville, had committed or was committing an offense. 
Officer Heslop's stop of the Defendant's vehicle was therefore 
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justified and the trial court erred in granting the 
Defendant's motion to suppress. This Court should therefore 
reverse the trial court's decision to grant the Defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted this Icy day of December, 
1996. 
KING Sc KING 
By; ^S*-Z^^ (L - C^<Jt 
STEVEN C. EARL, Esquire 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
330 North Main 
P. 0. Box 320 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
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Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
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SECONLiCIRCuii v w U K l . S I A I L I i I \ Ml U ¥ L L / 
D/^'T^ COTTMTV i .\YT(')N DEPARTMENT / ' T / 2 t t9SS 
KAYSVILLE CITY, • •• • •. : •-
Q R D E R G R A N 1 1 N G D E F E N D A N T . S 
PI a i nl 11 'I, : ' •'' MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
v s . '••": 
JOSEPH MULCAHY r ' '• ( -
Defendant. : Judt'e. Alfred ? vVaizenen 
Defendant's Motion Ui Suppress Evidence ea>^ - . . . - • ; - • 
< s. lc&imiony and evidence was presented bv the plaintiff ;md the defendant and 
ti)cn the mallei was lake.. ,.r(l • advisement by the Court. The Court having ca idu lh consideicd 
- . - I aw submitted .Uaintiff and the defendant now 
enters the following lindimr and o-,.i' 
! I K . . . ; . \ . . . . - . . • 
*d lu stup me defendant, because he d;u i.ot obsci\L Lhc dekndjn1 ,'»n;:nittine *n 
attempting u vomnii; a pi;N;.: offense Officer Heslop, in response to the radio disj . . . . : 
I >'i li MK topped Hi Llflii iiiiLiiii iu 11111 lie • i mncKfii'iite the matter if the dispatch was issued 
based upon articulated facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed 
3.n i . ;:<? 
In tliis case, if the dispatcher received information or facts thai would support • easonable 
suspicion that the defendant had or was committing an offense, it w 
pimmimicaled to (lie ((^pal'i'lin* by Dc Wayne Olsen. An objective review 01 (hi- i^Mmom :^id 
evidence would show thai 1 >eWayne Olsen ti >M the dispatcher: "I have a drunken individual on 
my door su., . .. ^  A ation alon e • an • 3fficer was dispatched 
toward the Olsen home. A few minutes later Mr. Olsen told the dispatcher: "He's getting into 
a white car in my driveway. Maybe a Toyota Celica;" and "he is driving off, now he is going 
east toward the mountain, then it will get into the main road that goes in front of Davis High 
School." Shortly thereafter Officer Heslop stopped the defendant as he observed the defendant 
in a white Mazda automobile driving in front of Davis High School. 
The Court finds that DeWayne Olsen did not articulate any facts to the dispatcher which 
would indicate a crime was being committed. He only said, "I have a drunken individual on my 
doorstep ringing my door bell." He told absolutely nothing to the dispatcher which would 
support his opinion that the individual was drunk. He didn't know who the individual was, did 
not talk to him, and made no observations as to poor balance or bad driving or the physical 
condition of the individual. Mr. Olsen really just had a hunch that he was the defendant, with 
whom he had talked on the telephone within the preceding hour. Mr Olsen testified that during 
that telephone conversation the defendant's speech was slowed and slurred and he was not using 
good judgment and he thought the defendant was intoxicated. But none of these facts from the 
telephone conversation were ever communicated to the dispatcher by Mr. Olsen. 
The Court therefore finds that the dispatcher did not have knowledge of any facts creating 
a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. When 
Officer Heslop stopped and seized the defendant in response to the dispatch which had been 
issued in the absence of articulated facts setting forth reasonable suspicion, said stop constituted 
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections 
under the United States Constitution and under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The 
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Court therefore orders that any evidence obtained as a result of said search and seizure be 
suppressed and not allowed to be introduced as evidence in this case. 
Dated this ^—<''""» (A 
1/1 ORDER 01 THE COURT: 
ALFRED£. >AN WAGENEN /f L 
CIRCUIT/COURT II DGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereb\ certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
! NDANT'S MOTION? v ^ i p p p i x s \.\ \m\c\- postage prepaid • tlv f..|i-.\'-np this 
..;
 y day of June, 1996-
Steven < Earl Sharon S. Sipes 
Kaysville City Prosecutor Miorney for Defendan 
P.O. Box 320 iiridley, Ward, Ha\a 
K-.x^n:. ITT $ufm ,s;< 25th Street 
ogden, UT 84401 
t 
S. 
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